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  Small businesses are the primary source of new jobs in the U.S. economy.  From 1990 to 
1995, businesses with fewer than 500 employees accounted for 76.5 percent of net new jobs.  
But small businesses have a very high turnover rate compared to large businesses.  Over 13 
percent of U.S. jobs in 1995 were in firms that did not exist before 1990 and over 12 percent of 
jobs in 1990 were in firms that had ceased to exist by 1995.
2  Despite the importance and the 
complexity of small business as a contributor to the U.S. economy, there has been surprisingly 
little academic research on the economic environment faced by small business owners or the 
effects of policy variables on small business success.    
  In this paper, we investigate how personal bankruptcy law affects small firms’ access to 
credit.  It is well known that the U.S. has separate bankruptcy procedures for individuals versus 
corporations. What is less well known is that personal bankruptcy procedures also apply to small 
firms.  When a firm is non-corporate, its debts are personal liabilities of the firm’s owner, so that 
lending to the firm is legally equivalent to lending to its owner. If the firm fails, the owner can 
file for bankruptcy and his/her business and unsecured personal debts will be discharged.  When 
a firm is a corporation, limited liability implies that the owner is not legally responsible for the 
firm’s debts. However, lenders to small corporations often require that the owner guarantee the 
loan and may also require that the owner give the lender a second mortgage on his/her house.  
This wipes out the owner’s limited liability for purposes of the particular loan and makes small 
corporate firms into corporate/non-corporate hybrids.  Thus personal bankruptcy law applies to 
non-corporate firms and may also apply to small corporate firms.
3 
  We test whether variation in personal bankruptcy exemptions across U.S. states affects  
small firms’ access to credit, using the 1993 National Survey of Small Business Finance 
(NSSBF). We find that small businesses are more likely to be denied credit if they are located in 
states with high rather than low homestead exemptions and that, if they receive loans, the loans 
are smaller and interest rates are higher.  We also find that bankruptcy exemption levels affect 
                                                 
2 See U.S. Small Business Administration (1998). 
3 Sullivan, Warren and Westbrook (1989) surveyed a sample of individuals who filed for bankruptcy during the 
1980’s and estimated that around 20% had debts from a failed business. This is nearly double the proportion of all 
U.S. households that has self-employment income. 
  3
both non-corporate and corporate firms, suggesting that lenders often ignore small business’ 
organizational status in making their loan decisions.      
          The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. After a brief literature review, section 
2 discusses personal bankruptcy law. Section 3 discusses a simple model of small business credit 
markets.  Section 4 presents the empirical results and Section 5 concludes. 
 
1.  Literature Review 
  We know of only one article that examines the effect of personal bankruptcy law on 
business credit markets.  Scott and Smith (1986) examined the effect of the new U.S. Bankruptcy 
Code, adopted in 1978, on business credit markets.  They argued that adoption of the Code 
caused the cost of business loans to increase and that lenders raised interest rates in response.    
They found support for this hypothesis in their empirical work.  However their study examined 
only the net effect on interest rates of many changes adopted simultaneously as part of the 1978 
Code, all of which applied uniformly over the U.S.  Our study, in contrast, uses cross-section 
variation in bankruptcy exemption levels across U.S. states to examine whether exemption levels 
affect the availability of small business credit.   
  On the personal bankruptcy side, Gropp, Scholz and White (1997) investigated how 
varying bankruptcy exemption levels across states affect markets for non-business loans.  They 
found that in states with higher exemption levels, applicants were more likely to be turned down 
for credit, but demand for loans increased.  Overall they found that higher bankruptcy exemption 
levels shift credit from households with low assets to those with high assets, since lenders are 
willing to accommodate the increased demand of the latter group but not the former. Berkowitz 
and Hynes (1999) and Lin and White (2001) re-examined this issue for mortgage loans. 
  Peterson and Rajan (1994, 1996) examine small business credit markets using earlier 
versions of the NSSBF.  They are mainly concerned with examining the effects of long term 
relationships between firms and banks and the effects of concentration in local banking markets 
on interest rates and availability of business credit.  More recent research on banking 
relationships, using a later version of the NSSBF, includes Cole (1998) and Cole, Goldberg, and 
L. White (1999).   Cavalluzzo, Cavalluzzo, and Wolken (1999) examine patterns of race  4
discrimination in banking relationships. There are also a number of theoretical models that 
examine the effects of bankruptcy on credit markets.
4 
  
2. Bankruptcy Law and Small Firms 
  When unincorporated firms fail, their owners typically have high debt levels, much of 
which consists of debts of the failed firm.  Owners have an incentive to file for bankruptcy, both 
because their unsecured personal and business debts will be discharged and because creditors 
must immediately terminate collection efforts and legal actions to obtain repayment.
5  Under the 
Chapter 7 bankruptcy procedure, debtors’ future earnings are completely exempt from the 
obligation to repay pre-bankruptcy debt, but they must turn over any assets they own above an 
exemption level to the bankruptcy trustee, who uses these assets to repay debt.  When debtors 
file under Chapter 7, they cannot file again for 6 years.   
  While bankruptcy is a matter of Federal law and the procedure is uniform across the 
country, Congress gave the states the right to set their own bankruptcy exemption levels and 
these vary widely.  Most states have several types of exemptions:  for equity in owner-occupied 
principle residences (the homestead exemption), for equity in cars, for cash, and for various 
types of goods (furniture, clothing, cooking utensils, farm implements, family bibles, tools of the 
trade, sometimes a horse, etc.).  In most states, the homestead exemption is the largest and other 
exemptions are small.  Debtors therefore have an incentive to convert cash or financial assets 
into additional home equity by repaying part of their mortgage loans before filing for 
bankruptcy, if their home equity is less than the homestead exemption.
6   
            There is also a second personal bankruptcy procedure, Chapter 13, and debtors are 
allowed to choose between them.  Under Chapter 13, debtors must propose a plan to use some of 
their future earnings to repay part or all of their debt, but all of their assets are exempt.  This 
procedure is generally less favorable to business owners than Chapter 7, because failed 
entrepreneurs often have no non-exempt assets and because having an obligation to repay past 
                                                 
4 Bester (1994) predicts that firms are less likely to default when loans are collateralized and Hart and Moore (1989) 
predict that firms are more likely to default when they have a single creditor rather than multiple creditors and when 
the liquidation value of the firm's assets is lower. Unfortunately our data do not allow these predictions to be tested, 
because default can occur anytime during the seven years prior to the survey while other firm characteristics are for 
the time of the survey only.   
5 One might question whether potential entrepreneurs would be familiar with bankruptcy law and bankruptcy 
exemptions.  We found that self-help manuals such as Legal Guide to Starting & Running a Small Business, Vol. 1, 
contain a clear explanation of bankruptcy.  See Steingold (1999). 
6 White (1998b) discusses various strategies for sheltering assets in bankruptcy.    5
debt from future earnings would make it difficult to start a new business.  Because creditors are 
entitled to receive no less in Chapter13 than they would have received in Chapter 7 (13 U.S.C. 
Section 1325(a)(4)), exemption levels are likely to have similar effects on credit markets 
regardless of the chapter that business owners would choose if they filed for bankruptcy.
7             
  Now consider the possibility that the firm is incorporated.  Corporate firms are legally 
separate from their owners, so that owners are not personally responsible for the debts of their 
corporations. Holding everything else constant, this means that small corporations are less credit-
worthy than small non-corporate firms, because the former have only the corporation’s assets to 
back up business debt, while the latter have both the firm’s assets and the owner’s personal 
assets.  Lenders also know that owners of small corporations can easily shift assets between their 
personal accounts and their corporations’ accounts, so that lenders may not view the 
corporate/non-corporate distinction as meaningful for small firms.  In making loans to small 
corporations, lenders therefore may require that owners personally guarantee the loans.  This 
abolishes the legal distinction between corporations and their owners for purposes of the 
particular loan and puts the owner’s personal assets at risk to repay the loan.  
 
    3. A Stylized Model 
  Suppose an entrepreneur owns a non-corporate firm and wishes to invest in a risky 
project.  In period 1, the entrepreneur has wealth W.  She can apply for a loan, D, to be used for a 
project with risky return, R.  Assuming that the loan is made, it will have an interest rate of r and 
be due in period 2.  The owner’s wealth in period 2 if she repays the loan will be W + R – 
D(1+r)  which we denote Z.  We further assume that Z has strictly positive density, f(Z).
8 
  In period 2, the owner may file for bankruptcy under Chapter 7.  Denote the combined 
value of the various bankruptcy exemptions in the owner’s state of residence as X.  Also suppose 
the cost of filing for bankruptcy is C, where C < D(1+ r).  C is assumed to include both the out-
of-pocket cost of filing and the cost of reduced access to credit in the future.   If the owner files 
for bankruptcy, then the debt of D(1+ r) will be discharged, but she must use any wealth that 
exceeds the exemption level, or max[Z – X - C, 0], to repay the debt.  Let Z* be the level of 
period 2 wealth at which owners are indifferent between filing versus not filing for bankruptcy, 
                                                 
7  An additional restriction that makes Chapter 13 less attractive than Chapter 7 to small business owners is that 
unsecured debt discharged in Chapter 13 cannot be higher than $250,000.  There is no limit in Chapter 7.   6
so that they file for bankruptcy if Z < Z* and repay in full otherwise.  In the region around Z*, 
owners’ net wealth is Z –D(1+ r) if they do not file for bankruptcy and X if they do (assuming 
that they pay the cost of bankruptcy C before filing).  Therefore they are indifferent between 
filing versus not filing at the wealth level Z* = X + D(1 + r).  This means that owners’ net 
wealth in period 2 has three regions: a high region in which owners repay the debt in full and 
their net wealth is  Z – D(1+r); a middle region in which owners file for bankruptcy, repay Z – X 
– C in bankruptcy, and have net wealth of X; and a low region in which owners file for 
bankruptcy, repay nothing, and have net wealth of  Z – C.  The dividing point between the 
middle and low regions is Z = X + C.    
  A representative lender maximizes expected profits, 
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with respect to the interest rate they are willing to offer. The first term on the left hand side is the 
expected value of repayment if owners file for bankruptcy and the second term is the expected 
value of repayment if owners avoid bankruptcy.   
  Lenders realize that the amount of debt that owners apply for depends on the interest rate 
and the exemption level, so that  D = (, ) DXr.  Solving for the first order condition of (1) with 
respect to r and assuming for simplicity that  0 = C , we get: 
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 Since f(Z) is positive, this becomes 
/ (, ) (, ) ( 1 ) r DXr D Xr r =− + .  To ensure that both D and (1+r) 
are nonnegative, the sign of 
/
r D  must be negative, i.e., entrepreneurs’ demand for debt must be 
negatively related to the interest rate. 
  As an example, suppose the demand curve for debt is additive, D(X, r) = α (X) - β r 
where β  is a positive constant.  The optimal interest rate is  r = (1/2)((α (X)/β ) -1).  Here the slope 
of the relationship between the interest rate and exemption level is determined by the sign of 
α (X).  Moreover, substituting r into the demand curve, we find D=(1/2)(β +α (X)).  Thus loan size 
should vary in the same way as the interest rate in response to changes in the exemption. 
                                                                                                                                                             
8 The model would be unchanged if part of the uncertainty in the entrepreneur’s period 2 wealth came from other 
sources, such as risky projects that the entrepreneur invested in before period 1.        7
We expect the sign of α (X) to be generally positive.  Bankruptcy provides partial wealth 
insurance to business owners by transferring some wealth from non-bankruptcy to bankruptcy 
states.  When the exemption level rises, the level of partial wealth insurance increases.  
Assuming that owners are risk averse, they benefit from the additional wealth insurance and 
therefore their demand for loans increases.
9    
    The market clearing condition for this model is that expected return (1) equal lenders’ 
opportunity cost of funds, or: 
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where rf  is the available risk free rate. Eq. (3) implies that the market clearing interest rate r is  
positively related to the probability of owners filing for bankruptcy and negatively related to the 
lender’s expected percentage return conditional on bankruptcy.   As the exemption level rises, 
the probability of bankruptcy rises and the expected percentage return in bankruptcy falls (since 
entrepreneurs repay Z-X if  * Z Z X ≤ ≤ ), so that the market clearing interest rate must rise.  If 
the exemption level is high enough, credit rationing occurs because no interest rate is high 
enough to clear the market and/or owners’ demand for credit falls to zero.  Note that in this 
simple model, owners always file for bankruptcy if the exemption level is unlimited.  Therefore 
lenders would never lend in states with unlimited exemptions.   
In this model, there is either no credit rationing or complete credit rationing that shuts the 
loan market down completely.  But partial credit rationing would occur in the model if individual 
owners’ creditworthiness varied according to some observable characteristic, such as owners’ 
wealth or their firms’ wealth in period 1.  Then the threshold for credit rationing would vary with 
wealth as well as the exemption level.  As the exemption level rises, lenders first reach the no-
lending threshold for owners who have low wealth.  They cease lending to low-wealth owners, 
but continue to lend to owners having medium or high wealth.  As the exemption level continues 
to rise, lenders would reach the no-lending threshold for owners with medium wealth.  They 
cease lending to medium-wealth owners, but continue to lend to owners having high wealth.  
Thus as the exemption level rises, lenders gradually impose credit rationing on a higher fraction 
of potential borrowers.
10   
                                                 
9 See Fan and White (2001) for discussion of how bankruptcy provides partial wealth insurance for entrepreneurs 
and a derivation of the optimal bankruptcy exemption level.     
10 Credit rationing is usually associated with models that assume heterogeneous borrowers and asymmetric 
information concerning borrowers’ types.  However as the discussion here shows, it may also occur when all  8
  Finally, note that although we did not differentiate between the homestead and other 
exemptions, it is straightforward to show that the predictions are qualitatively the same for both.  
Berkowitz and Hynes (1999) and Lin and White (2001) present models that differentiate between 
the two types of exemptions and also differentiate between secured (mortgage) versus unsecured 
(business) loans. 
     
4. Empirical Tests 
  Our primary data source is the 1993 NSSBF.  This survey covers a representative sample 
of U.S. non-financial, non-farm, for-profit businesses that have fewer than 500 employees. There 
are approximately 1,750 non-corporate firms and 2,800 corporate firms in the sample.
11  
  The NSSBF asks managers whether their firms applied for credit within the past three 
years and, if so, was the most recent application for credit denied.   Managers are also asked 
whether they were discouraged from applying for loans at any time during the past three years 
because they anticipated being turned down.  We define a dummy variable, 
“discouraged/denied”, which equals one if managers either were discouraged from applying for 
credit or applied but were turned down on their most recent application within the past three 
years. We refer to firms that are discouraged/denied as credit rationed and we run separate 
regressions explaining whether corporate and non-corporate firms are credit rationed.
12  
            The main explanatory variables of interest are the homestead and personal property 
exemptions in the state where the firm is located.  The personal property exemption is defined as 
the sum of the state’s exemptions for cash and for equity in vehicles, plus the value of the 
wildcard exemption.  Table 1 shows the two exemptions by state in 1993.  The homestead 
exemption varies widely across states, from zero in one state to unlimited in seven states, with a 
median value of $15,000.  In contrast, the personal property exemption is both smaller and less 
                                                                                                                                                             
information is common knowledge.  Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) show that credit rationing may occur when increases 
in the interest rate would cause borrowers to shift from safe to risky projects or would cause adverse selection 
among borrowers.  Applied to our context, this suggests that in response to an increase in the exemption level, 
lenders may impose credit rationing rather than raise the interest rate, because raising the interest rate would reduce 
lenders’ return by lowering borrower quality.   Credit rationing of this type could occur at any exemption level, 
although it seems more likely to occur at medium or high exemption levels.  See Longhofer (1997) for a model of 
credit rationing with heterogeneous borrowers and common knowledge. 
11 The NSSBF is produced by the Federal Reserve Board and the Small Business Administration.  See Cole and 
Wolken (1995) for discussion.  We use the internal version of the dataset, which identifies the state in which the 
firm is located.    9
variable.  The median value of the personal property exemption is $7,000, with a minimum value 
of $2,800.  The maximum personal property exemption is $60,000 in Texas, but only two other 
small states besides Texas have personal property exemptions higher than $25,000.  The 
correlation between the two exemptions is .24, but falls to .094 if Texas is excluded.
13  
  We enter the homestead exemption as dollar value (in thousands of dollars) and dollar 
value squared.  For states with unlimited homestead exemptions, we set the homestead 
exemption equal to the maximum dollar value across all states, which is $160,000.  We also 
enter a separate dummy variable which equals one for states that have unlimited homestead 
exemptions.  This means that the coefficient of the unlimited exemption dummy captures the 
marginal effect of the homestead exemption being unlimited rather than $160,000.   We enter the 
personal property exemption as dollar value (in thousands of dollars) and dollar value squared.  
Since no states have unlimited personal property exemptions, there is no unlimited dummy. 
  An important issue is whether the bankruptcy exemption level can be treated as 
exogenous to lenders’ decisions to ration credit.  As part of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code, Congress 
adopted a uniform Federal bankruptcy exemption, but it gave the states the right to opt out of the 
Federal exemption by adopting their own exemptions.  All states did so by 1983, although about 
one-third allowed their residents to choose between the state’s exemption and the Federal 
exemption.
14  Between 1983 and 1993, only a few states changed their exemption levels each 
year and the Federal bankruptcy exemptions remained unchanged.  Exemption levels do not 
appear to be correlated with state loan market or demographic characteristics:  a recent study 
explaining state exemption levels in the 1990’s found that the only significant correlate was the 
state’s exemption level in the 1920’s (Posner, Hynes, and Malani, 2001).
15  We therefore treat 
exemption levels as exogenous. 
                                                                                                                                                             
12 Firms may be both discouraged and denied, because they may have been turned down on their most recent loan 
application and also discouraged from applying for a loan at some time during the past three years.   See below for 
tests of whether the two types of firms differ.  
13 In computing a dollar value for the personal property exemption, we ignore exemptions for specific goods and use 
only exemptions for cash, vehicles and near-cash assets such as jewelry that are specified as dollar values.  Two 
states have unlimited exemptions for a single vehicle:  Louisiana (for a “non-luxury auto”) and Hawaii (for an 
otherwise unspecified vehicle).  We code these at $20,000 and $40,000, respectively. 
14 Sixteen states allowed their residents to choose between the state and the Federal exemptions as of 1993.  We 
substitute the Federal exemption for the state exemption if the firm is located in a state that allows its residents to 
choose and the Federal exemption is higher.  Some states also have higher exemptions for married couples who file 
for bankruptcy and, if so, we use the exemptions applicable to married couples.    
15 The authors also ran a regression explaining state exemption levels in the 1920’s and found that the population 
density and the proportion of farmers at that time were statistically significant.  They interpret this result as 
indicating that debt relief was a more salient political issue in the past than it is now.    10
  Other important variables are measures of the owner’s and the firm’s previous financial 
difficulties.  A previous bankruptcy filing has a theoretically ambiguous effect on credit-
worthiness.  Because debtors who have filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 7 cannot file again 
under Chapter 7 for six years, they are more credit-worthy from lenders’ viewpoint.  But debtors 
can still file for bankruptcy under Chapter 13 or default on repaying their loans without filing for 
bankruptcy.  If they do the latter, then lenders have the right to sue for repayment, but such 
lawsuits are often not financially worthwhile.  In addition, a past bankruptcy filing is evidence of 
weak entrepreneurial ability.  These considerations suggest that lenders may view a past 
bankruptcy filing as negative evidence of credit-worthiness.  In contrast, a past personal or 
business delinquency is unambiguously negative evidence concerning credit-worthiness.  It 
signals weak entrepreneurial ability and also signals that debtors are knowledgeable about 
default procedures and willing to use them.  Our bankruptcy variable is a dummy variable that 
equals one if the firm or its principle owner filed for bankruptcy within the past seven years.  Our 
delinquency variables are separate dummy variables for whether owners have been delinquent on 
personal financial obligations during the past 3 years and whether the firm has been delinquent 
on business obligations during the past 3 years.
16   
  We include a number of firm demographic characteristics as additional evidence 
concerning firms’ perceived creditworthiness.  These are the firm’s age, the owner’s age, 
separate dummy variables for whether more than 50% of the firm’s equity is owned by an 
African-American or a member of another minority group (Hispanic or Asian), separate dummy 
variables for whether the firm is family-owned or female-owned, and the firm's total 
employment in log form.  Financial variables include the firm's ratio of debts to assets, its ratio 
of profits to assets,
17 the rate of growth of sales between 1990 and 1992, and a vector of dummy 
variables for the firm's sector (results for the latter are not shown).
18  We also include a dummy 
                                                 
16 The personal financial delinquency variable equals one if the owner has been delinquent by 60 days or more on 
one or more personal obligations.  The business delinquency variable is similarly defined.   All of the bankruptcy 
and financial delinquency variables in our data are self-reported.  But lenders can and routinely do obtain 
information on past bankruptcy filings and past financial delinquencies from credit reporting services.   See White 
(1998a) for a model of the relationship between default and bankruptcy.  
17 Because the latest loan application can be any time during the past three years, financial variables such as the level 
of debt and the level of assets may or may not include the proceeds of the latest loan.  See below for discussion of 
robustness checks in which we compare the results for firms that applied for loans more recently versus further back 
in time.      
 
18 Gordon and Mackie-Mason (1994) argue that firms have tax incentives to choose corporate versus non-corporate 
form, which implies that the two types of firms may differ systematically.  In particular, owners of money-losing 
firms have an incentive to choose non-corporate status so that the firm's losses can be deducted against other income  11
variable for a high Herfindahl index of bank deposit concentration in the market where the firm 
is located and the number of lenders that the firm borrows from.  If the lender is a bank, we 
include the number of years that the firm and the bank have had a relationship and we also 
include a dummy variable that equals one if the years of relationship variable is missing.  We 
also include dummy variables for whether the firm has a checking or saving account with the 
bank and for whether the firm purchases services from the bank that are information intensive.
19 
Finally, as a measure of local macroeconomic conditions, we include the unemployment rate in 
the state where the firm is located. 
  Table 2 shows summary statistics.
20  Statistics are shown by type of firm and separately 
by whether firms are credit rationed (discouraged/denied).  The overall probability of firms being 
credit rationed is 526/(526+1303) = .29 for non-corporate firms versus 736/(736+2072) = .26 for 
corporations. Firms that are credit rationed are much more likely to have owners who have filed 
for bankruptcy or have been financially delinquent in the past.  The proportion of credit rationed 
firms/owners that have filed for bankruptcy is .06-.08, compared to only .01 for non-credit-
rationed firms/owners.   The proportion of credit rationed firms that have past business 
delinquencies is .36 for non-corporate firms and .45 for corporate firms, compared to only .11 
and .13 for non-corporate and corporate firms that are not credit-rationed, respectively.  The 
figures for past personal delinquency have a similar pattern.  Among the important differences 
between the two types of firms are that corporate firms are larger on average, less likely to be 
family owned, and less likely to be owned by African-Americans or other minorities.   
  Credit rationing.  Table 3 shows the results of logit regressions explaining whether 
firms are credit rationed.  Non-corporate firms are in the left hand column and corporate firms 
are in the right hand column.
21  Variables that are significant at the 95% level are asterisked.  The 
dollar homestead exemption variable and the unlimited homestead exemption dummy have the 
                                                                                                                                                             
of the owner; while owners of profitable firms have an incentive to choose corporate form in order to take advantage 
of corporate tax rates that tend to be lower than the top individual tax rate.  Thus choice of organizational form may 
signal the firm's profit level.  However because we control for individual firms' profit levels (relative to assets), we 
do not expect the choice of organizational form to bias our results for the effects of bankruptcy exemption levels. 
19 The “years of relationship missing” variable is included because otherwise we would have to drop 120 non-
corporate and 50 corporate observations.  We follow Petersen and Rajan (1994) in our choice of financial variables.  
Following their lead, we truncate sales growth at the 95% level and define the cutoff for a high Herfindahl index at 
HHI ≥  1800.       
20 In all calculations, we use the NSSBF sampling weights which make the sample representative of the target 
population of  U.S. small businesses.    
21 Robust standard errors clustered by state are reported.  See Moulton (1986).    12
predicted positive signs in both regressions, while the squared dollar homestead exemption 
variables are negative in both regressions.
22     
The personal property exemption coefficients are not statistically significant for either 
type of firm.  This probably reflects the fact that the personal property exemption is smaller and 
less variable than the homestead exemption.  In addition, the state that has by far the largest 
personal property exemption—Texas—also has an unlimited homestead exemption, so that the 
homestead exemption may be capturing part of the effect of the personal property exemption on 
lending behavior.
23   
  The past bankruptcy filing and past personal and business delinquency variables are all 
positive and significant for both types of firms.  The sizes of the coefficients are similar in the 
two samples, suggesting that lenders view the effects of past bankruptcy and delinquency 
similarly for non-corporate and corporate borrowers.  Although the theoretical prediction for the 
sign of the past bankruptcy variable is ambiguous, the results suggest that lenders view a past 
bankruptcy filing as a clear negative signal concerning credit-worthiness.  The positive signs of 
the past financial delinquency variables are also in line with our predictions.
24          
  We calculated the predicted probability of firms being credit rationed for various 
exemption levels.  We assume that both types of firms are family-owned, are not African-
American- or other minority-owned, and have average values for the other right-hand-side 
variables.  If a non-corporate firm is located in a state whose homestead and personal property 
exemptions are both at the 25
th percentile of the relevant distributions and if neither the firm nor 
its owner has previously filed for bankruptcy or been delinquent, then its probability of being 
credit rationed is .122.  This figure rises to .140 if the homestead exemption in the firm's state is 
instead at the 50
th percentile, and to .196 if the homestead exemption is at the 75
th percentile.  
                                                 
22 The linear term for corporations and the unlimited dummy for noncorporates were not significant. However, an F-
test shows that the three homestead exemption variables are jointly statistically significant at the .99 level in both 
samples. 
23 Studies of the effect of bankruptcy exemptions on whether loan applicants are denied mortgage loans have found 
positive and significant effects for the personal property exemption.  But these studies use much larger datasets.  See 
Berkowitz and Hynes (1999) and Lin and White (2001).   
24 The results for the demographic and lender relationship variables have been discussed by other authors.  Petersen 
and Rajan (1994) and Berger and Udell (1995) found that the number of years that the firm has had a relationship 
with its lender, whether the firm has a checking account with the lender, and whether the firm buys information-
intensive services from the lender are important determinants of whether firms are credit rationed.  For discussion of 
the result that African-American and minority-owned firms are more likely to be credit rationed, see Cole (1998), 
Cole, Goldberg, and L. White (1999), and  Cavalluzzo, Cavalluzzo, and Wolken (1999).  All of these papers used 
the same or earlier versions of the NSSBF.  13
Overall, the probability of non-corporate firms being credit rationed rises by 32% if firms are 
located in states with unlimited rather than low homestead exemptions.   
        For corporate firms, the pattern is similar.  The predicted probability of being credit rationed 
is .196 if both exemptions are at the 25th percentile, .221 if the homestead exemption rises to the 
70
th percentile, .172 if the exemption rises to the 80
th percentile and .255 if the exemption is 
unlimited.  Overall, the probability of corporate firms being credit rationed rises by 30% if firms 
are located in states with unlimited rather than low homestead exemptions.  These results are 
generally supportive of the theoretical model discussed in the previous section.  Risk averse 
entrepreneurs gain from having partial wealth insurance and this causes demand for loans to rise 
even though interest rates are rising.   
Nevertheless, the probability of credit rationing is not monotonically increasing in the 
homestead exemption level.  For non-corporates, for example, the probability drops from .196 at 
the 75
th percentile to .154 at the 90
th percentile, and then rises to .161 if the homestead exemption 
becomes unlimited.  For corporates, the probability of credit rationing drops in the 70
th – 100
th 
percentile range, before rising again when the exemption level becomes unlimited.  We do not 
have a good explanation for why the probability of credit rationing displays this non-monotonic 
behavior when the homestead exemption level is high but not unlimited.   
  These results have several implications.  First, corporations are more likely to be credit 
rationed than non-corporate firms over most of the observed range (though not when the 
homestead exemption is around the 90
th percentile).  This is in accord with our predictions, since 
owners’ assets always guarantee the debt of non-corporate firms but do not always guarantee the 
debt of corporate firms.  All else equal, more assets are available to back up loans to non-
corporations.  Second, the marginal effect of bankruptcy exemptions are larger for non-corporate 
than corporate firms.   This makes sense because the sample of corporate firms is a mixture of 
corporations that are able to borrow on their own and corporations that are unable to borrow 
unless their owners provide guarantees.  For the former group, the exemption level is irrelevant 
and, for the latter, it should have the same marginal effect as for the sample of non-corporations.  
Because the marginal effects of the exemption variables for corporations are an average over the 
two types, we expect them to be smaller than the marginal effects for non-corporate firms.      
  Holding the exemption levels fixed, the probability of firms being credit rationed 
approximately triples when their owners have previously filed for bankruptcy and approximately 
doubles when firms or their owners have previous financial delinquencies, with a previous  14
business delinquency having a larger effect than a previous personal delinquency.  These effects 
are similar for both non-corporate and corporate firms.  Both types of firms have about a 50% 
probability of being credit rationed if their owners have previously filed for bankruptcy.  The 
results suggest that a past bankruptcy filing or a past delinquency severely handicaps 
entrepreneurs who attempt to obtain loans for a new business.
25  
The effect of bankruptcy exemptions on the probability of credit rationing should depend 
on the wealth of the potential borrower, since debtors are less likely to file for bankruptcy at a 
given exemption level when they have higher wealth.  Because our dataset consists of small 
businesses, we do not know the business owner’s personal wealth.  But we do know the net value 
of business assets minus liabilities and we use this as a proxy for entrepreneurs’ wealth.  We 
reran the model in table 3 with interactions between all of the exemption variables and a dummy 
variable that equals one if business net assets are in the top half of the distribution.   
The results are shown in table 4 for the exemption variables only.  Firms with relatively 
few net assets have exemption coefficients that are larger in absolute value and more statistically 
significant than the results for the entire sample in table 3.  For firms with high net assets, the 
overall effect--calculated by adding the coefficient for the low asset firms plus the coefficient on 
the interaction term--is close to zero.  Thus the exemption is more important as a determinant of 
credit rationing for firms with low net asset levels than for firms with high net asset levels.   
This finding is as expected.  Demand for loans is increasing in the exemption, regardless 
of whether the firm has high or low wealth.  But while lenders accommodate the increased loan 
demand for customers whose businesses have high net assets; they respond by rationing credit to 
customers whose businesses have low net assets.
26      
                                                 
25 We ran several additional checks to determine whether the results are robust to changes in the specification of the 
model.   First, we checked whether the two types of credit rationed firms--“discouraged” versus “denied”--differ 
systematically from each other.   To do so, we reran the model in table 3 for each group separately.  Second, we 
redefined our benchmark credit rationing variable so that firms were treated as credit rationed if they were denied 
credit on a prior loan application, even though their most recent application was approved, or if they were offered 
credit but on worse terms than they applied for.  Third, firms’ most recent loan application may occur anytime 
during the three years prior to the survey.  Early loan applications present potential endogeneity problems, because 
the bankruptcy exemption variables and the other control variables are for the year of the survey. We reran the 
models in table 3, but excluded firms whose most recent loan applications occurred more than one year prior to the 
survey.  In all cases, the results for the exemption and financial delinquency variables remained substantially the 
same as those in table 3.      
 
26 See Gropp, Scholz and White (1997) for discussion of the effect of borrowers’ wealth on access to credit by 
households.   They find similar differences in the probability of credit rationing for low versus high wealth 
borrowers.   
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   Interest rates. Table 5 gives the results of Tobit regressions explaining the interest rate 
on the most recent loan that the firm obtained.
27  The samples are the same as for the model of 
credit rationing in table 3.  All firms that did not receive credit are right censored at an interest 
rate of 17 percent (the maximum interest rate in the sample is 16.5 percent).
28  All of the 
homestead exemption variables are statistically significant in both samples, except for the 
unlimited homestead exemption dummy in the corporate sample.  The results are similar to the 
credit rationing results: the homestead exemption coefficients are positive, the squared 
exemption coefficients are negative, and the unlimited exemption coefficients are positive.  
Again, none of the personal property exemption variables are statistically significant.  The past 
bankruptcy variables are significantly positive as expected in both samples, but of the past 
delinquency variables, only the personal delinquency variable in the corporate sample is 
statistically significant.  Among the other variables, an interesting result is that the high 
Herfindahl index variable and the number of lenders variable are significantly negative (though 
only at the 10% level for non-corporate firms).  Small businesses pay lower interest rates when 
there is more competition in the local lending markets and when firms borrow from more 
lenders.   Larger firms also pay lower interest rates and firms owned by African-Americans and 
other minorities pay higher interest rates.          
  We calculated the predicted effects of changes in the homestead exemption level on 
interest rates, following the same procedure as used above.  If the homestead exemption 
increases from the 25
th to 50
th percentile, the interest rate for non-corporate firms is predicted to 
rise by .60 percentage points and, if the exemption increase is from the 50
th to the 75
th percentile, 
it rises by a further 1.33 percentage points.  The predicted overall increase from the 25
th 
percentile to unlimited is 2.15 percentage points.  For corporate firms, the interest rate rises by 
.27 percentage points when the exemption level increases from the 25
th to the 50
th percentile and 
by a further .56 percentage points from the 50
th to the 75
th percentile.  For both firm types, 
                                                 
27 We did not use a two-stage Heckman model because it did not seem possible to separate the credit rationing 
model from the interest rate determination model, since any observable information that affects what interest rate 
lenders charge also affects whether they ration credit.   
28 Because we have no information concerning the interest rate for firms that were credit rationed, we reran the 
model with the truncated interest rate set at levels between 18 and 30%. The results for higher interest rates were 
that the size and significance of the homestead exemption coefficients gradually increased, but everything remained 
the same.  We report the results for the interest rate of 17% because this specification has the highest log-likelihood 
value.    16
however, the increase in interest rates is non-monotonic when exemptions are above the 75
th 
percentiles.  This result is surprising but consistent with the credit rationing results.  
            As expected, the responsiveness of the interest rate to changes in the exemption level is 
higher for non-corporate firms than corporations.  This is presumably because lenders are willing 
to lend to some small corporate firms qua corporations, but treat other small corporate firms as 
though they were non-corporate—i.e., they require that owners personally guarantee the loans 
and therefore bankruptcy exemption levels matter.   A past bankruptcy filing also has a larger 
effect on non-corporate than corporate firms:  it is predicted to increase the interest rate for non-
corporate firms by 5.4 percentage points and for corporate firms by 2.1 percentage points.      
  Loan size.  For the most recent loan application, the NSSBF asks the size of the loan that 
the lender offered.
29  We ran Tobit models explaining loan size (in logs) for the samples of non-
corporate and corporate firms where loan size is left censored at zero. Again, we expect the 
coefficients to reflect a combination of supply and demand considerations.  An increase in the 
bankruptcy exemption level causes entrepreneurs to demand larger loans because the 
consequences of business failure are not as bad, but also causes lenders to reduce loan supply 
because lending is more risky.  Thus we could observe either positive or negative coefficients on 
the exemption variables, depending on which effect is larger.   
  The results are shown in table 6.  For both types of firms, the signs of the homestead 
exemption variables are reversed from the previous results—the homestead exemption and 
unlimited homestead exemption variables have negative signs, but the squared homestead 
exemption variables are positive.  All three variables are statistically significant for non-
corporate firms, but the unlimited exemption dummy is insignificant for corporate firms.  The 
personal property exemption variables are not significant in either sample.   As expected, the past 
bankruptcy filing and past personal delinquency variables are negative and significant in both 
regressions, but the past business delinquency variables are insignificant.   
  Finally we turn to the predicted effects of the homestead exemption level on loan size.  
For non-corporate firms, if the exemption increases from the 25
th to the 75
th percentile, loan size 
falls by about $79,000. The overall change predicted by an increase of the exemption from the 
                                                 
29 The NSSBF actually asks separately how much the firm applied for and how much the lender offered.  In theory, 
these separate measures might allow us to separately estimate a demand curve from the former and a supply curve 
from the latter.  However, in practice, the two variables are extremely closely related, with a correlation coefficient 
of .994. Presumably, firms apply for the amount of credit that they expect lenders to provide and lenders may tell 
borrowers in advance how much they are willing to lend.  17
25
th percentile to unlimited is a reduction of $198,000.  For corporate firms, if the exemption 
increases from the 25
th to the 75
th percentile, loan size is predicted to fall by $68,000 and when 
increased from the 25
th percentile to unlimited, loan size falls by $41,000.  The general 
decreasing relationship between loan size and the exemption level is consistent with our model, 
but there is again a region above the 75
th percentile where predicted loan size rises rather than 
falls as the exemption level increases.  As predicted, the marginal effects of changes in the 
exemption level are larger for non-corporate firms than for corporations.  Finally, a past personal 
bankruptcy filing is predicted to reduce loan size for non-corporate firms by $470,000 and for 
corporations by $72,000.   
 
5. Conclusion  
  This paper investigates how personal bankruptcy law affects small firms’ access to credit.  
We show that higher personal bankruptcy exemptions are predicted to cause increased credit 
rationing and higher interest rates.  These predictions apply to both non-corporate firms and 
corporations, although the marginal effects are should be larger for non-corporate firms.  
Personal bankruptcy exemptions affect credit markets for small corporate firms because small 
business owners can easily transfer funds from the firm to themselves even if the firm is 
corporate.  Thus lenders may not view the corporate/non-corporate distinction as meaningful for 
small firms.  
  We test the model and find that small businesses located in states with high homestead 
exemptions are more likely to be credit rationed and, if they receive loans, interest rates are 
higher and loan size is smaller.  However we find that the effect of increases in exemption levels 
is non-monotonic:  as the exemption level rises, the probability of credit rationing and the 
interest rate first rise, then fall, and then rise again when the exemption level becomes unlimited.  
For loan size, the pattern is the same with the opposite sign.  We also find that the effect of 
changes in exemption levels on the probability of credit rationing is much larger for firms with 
low net assets than for firms with high net assets, regardless of whether they are corporate or 
non-corporate.  When owners of either type of firm have previously filed for bankruptcy, the 
probability that their firms are credit rationed triples and, when firms or their owners have 
previously been delinquent on personal or business obligations, the probability that firms are 
credit rationed doubles.      18
  Each year for the past several years, the U.S. Congress has adopted legislation that  
would limit homestead exemptions to a maximum of  $100,000.  Although the intended effect of 
the change is to discourage well-off consumers from taking advantage of bankruptcy to shield 
their assets from creditors, our results suggest that the change would make it easier for small 
businesses to obtain credit.   19
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Table 1: 1993 Bankruptcy Exemptions by State 
Chapter 7 bankruptcy exemption levels are reported by state from Elias, Renauer and Leonard (1994). The 
homestead exemption is for equity in owner-occupied principle residences.  The personal property exemption is the 
sum of the state’s exemptions for cash, equity in vehicles, and near cash assets such as jewelry.  
  Homestead exemption ($)  Personal prop. exemption ($) 
Alabama 10,000  6,000 
Alaska 54,000  6,000 
Arizona   100,000  3,300 
Arkansas Unlimited  2,900 
California   75,000  5,000 
Colorado   60,000  2,000 
Connecticut   15,000  10,700 
D.C. 15,000  10,700 
Delaware 15,000  10,700 
Florida Unlimited  2,000 
Georgia 10,000  2,800 
Hawaii 40,000  42,000 
Iowa   Unlimited   10,200 
Idaho     100,000  3,000 
Illinois 15,000  6,400 
Indiana   15,000  8,200 
Kansas   Unlimited  40,000 
Kentucky   10,000  7,000 
Louisiana   15,000  25,000 
Massachusetts 100,000  3,350 
Maryland   0  11,000 
Maine 15,000  3,200 
Michigan 15,000  10,700 
Minnesota Unlimited  6,000 
Missouri 8,000  3,500 
Mississippi 150,000  20,000 
Montana   80,000  1,200 
North Carolina  20,000  10,000 
North Dakota  160,000  12,400 
Nebraska 20,000  5,000 
New Hampshire  60,000  2,000 
New Jersey  15,000  10,700 
New Mexico  40,000  9,000 
Nevada 95,000  3,000 
New York  20,000  9,800 
Ohio 10,000  3,600 
Oklahoma Unlimited  6,000 
Oregon 20,000  16,200 
Pennsylvania 15,000  10,700 
Rhode Island  15,000  10,700 
South Carolina  15,000  10,700 
South Dakota  60,000  4,000 
Tennessee 7,500  8,000 
Texas   Unlimited  60,000 
Utah 10,000  3,000 
Virginia 10,000  10,000 
Vermont 60,000  21,200 
Washington   60,000  7,000 
Wisconsin 40,000  4,400 
West Virginia  15,000  2,800 
Wyoming 20,000  4,000  22
         
Table 2:  Summary Statistics 
This table gives means and standard deviations of select variables from 1993 National Survey of 
Small Business Finance.  Noncorporate firms include proprietorships and partnerships; corporate 
firms include corporations and S-corporations. Credit-constrained indicates that the firm was 
either discouraged from applying for a loan or applied and was denied, both within the past three 
years.  All dollar amounts are in thousands.  
 













Mean  Std Dev  Mean Std Dev  Mean  Std Dev  Mean  Std Dev 
Discouraged/denied    0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 
Discouraged  0.00 0.00 0.95 0.22 0.00 0.00 0.93 0.25 
Denied  0.00 0.00 0.57 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.47 0.50 
Homestead  exemption    61.86 57.18 66.73 56.69 56.14 57.68 55.74 56.16 
Personal  prop.  exemption    12.64 16.27 12.84 17.00 11.61 14.47 10.83 13.73 
Past  bankruptcy  filing  0.01 0.11 0.06 0.25 0.01 0.11 0.08 0.27 
Past  personal  delinquency  0.09 0.28 0.37 0.48 0.05 0.22 0.25 0.43 
Past  business  delinquency  0.11 0.31 0.36 0.48 0.13 0.33 0.45 0.50 
Owner’s  age  50.65 11.83 46.51 10.18 51.57 11.27 47.99 10.63 
Firm’s  age  15.43 13.77 10.95 8.57 17.26 14.61 12.76 12.19 
Family  owned  0.89 0.31 0.94 0.23 0.75 0.44 0.77 0.42 
Female  owned  0.23 0.42 0.26 0.44 0.21 0.41 0.27 0.44 
African-American  owned  0.06 0.24 0.26 0.44 0.04 0.20 0.18 0.39 
Other  minority  owned  0.23 0.42 0.51 0.50 0.13 0.34 0.32 0.47 
Employment  9.31 30.19  6.23 21.35 52.69 76.86 29.52 54.90 
Profits/assets  ratio  1.26 6.31 1.22 4.24 0.49 2.81 0.47 3.70 
Debt/assets  ratio  0.53 0.82 0.70 0.80 0.60 0.62 1.03 2.94 
Sales  growth  15.39  416.72 3.12 43.69 2.38  39.29 1.25 2.40 
HHI  >  1800  0.53 0.50 0.47 0.50 0.49 0.50 0.42 0.49 
Years of bank relationship  9.83  8.82  6.91 5.95  10.00  9.39  6.72  6.52 
Checking  account  at  bank  0.94 0.25 0.89 0.32 0.94 0.24 0.87 0.34 
Number  of  lenders  0.03 0.24 0.06 0.39 0.19 0.67 0.27 0.98 
State  unemployment  rate  0.07 0.02 0.07 0.02 0.07 0.02 0.07 0.02 
Loan size   759.92    5539.52  308.73 1234.63  1406.30  5265.58  849.02  2893.89 
Interest rate   8.91          2.40  10.17 3.76  8.05  1.76  8.96  2.56 
           




Table 3: Logit Regressions Explaining Whether Firms are Credit Rationed  
 
The dependent variable is whether firms were credit constrained (discouraged/denied) within the 
past three years.  Standard errors are shown in parentheses.  Asterisks indicate significance at the 
95% level. 
 
  Non-corporate firms  Corporate firms 
  Coefficient Std.error  Coefficient Std.error 
 
Homestead exemption  0.0186*   (.0074)  0.0115   (.00625) 
Homestead exemption squared  -.00011*   (.000045)  -.000120*   (.0000438) 
Unlimited homestead exemption  0.512   (.377)  1.69*   (.436) 
Personal property exemption  0.0118   (.0209)  0.0104   (.0223) 
Personal property exemption squared  -.000218   (.00033)  -.000281   (.000376) 
Past bankruptcy   1.58*   (.444)  1.58*   (.364) 
Past personal delinquency    0.902*   (.219)  0.791*   (.219) 
Past business delinquency    1.24*   (.175)  1.16*   (.169) 
Owner’s age  -0.0143*   (.0069)  -0.00823   (.00568) 
Firm’s age   -0.0103   (.00857)  -0.00728   (.00664) 
Family owned  0.492*   (.254)  0.0635   (.100) 
Female owned  -0.156   (.126)  0.126   (.154) 
African-American owned  1.20*   (.180)  1.008*   (.214) 
Other minority owned    0.548*   (.173)  0.212   (.176) 
Employment (in logs)  -0.0750   (.0865)  -0.176*   (.0604) 
Profit/asset ratio  0.0119   (.00857)  -0.0493*   (.0210) 
Debt/asset ratio  0.197   (.110)  0.265*   (.095) 
Sales Growth   -.000157   (.000227)  -.000453   (.00102) 
HHI > 1800  -0.0633   (.184)  -0.0312   (.198) 
Years of bank relationship  -0.0264*   (.0142)  -0.0240*   (.0117) 
Years of bank relationship missing  -.195  (.310)  .297  (.584) 
Checking account at bank  -0.369   (.273)  -0.700*   (.215) 
Number of lenders  0.356   (.215)  0.0619   (.0612) 
State unemployment rate   1.92   (3.93)  -1.415   (5.02) 
Number of observations   1801   2780 
Pseudo-R
2 0.189  0.160 
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Table 4: Logit Regressions Explaining Whether Firms are Credit Rationed  
When Net Assets are High versus Low 
 
The model is the same as in table 3, except that the exemption variables are interacted with a 
dummy variable equaling one if the firm’s net assets are in the top half of the distribution.  
Assets are net of liabilities.  Only the results for the homestead exemption variables are given.  
Standard errors are shown in parentheses.  Asterisks indicate significance at the 95% level. 
  
 
  Non-corporate firms  Corporate firms 
 Coefficient    Std.error  Coefficient  Std.error 
Homestead exemption   .0248*  (.00793)  .0167*  (.00631) 
Homestead exemption squared   -.000167*  (.000050)  -.000190*  (.000045) 
Unlimited homestead exemption  
 
.949* (.413) 2.37* (.626) 
Homestead exemp x high asset dummy  -.0129*  (.00443)  -.00964  (.00651) 
Homestead exemp squared x high asset 
dummy 
.000105* (.000034) .000127* (.000057) 
Unlimited homestead exemp x high asset 
dummy 
-.947 (.567) -1.25 (.850) 
Pseudo-R





      Table 5:  Effects of Bankruptcy Exemptions on Interest Rates 
  
This table presents results from Tobit regressions explaining the interest rate on loans for non-
corporate and corporate firms.  Interest rates for firms that were credit rationed are right censored 
17 percent, which is above the maximum value of 16.5 percent in the sample. Asterisks indicate 
statistical significance at the 95 percent level. 
 
           
  Non-corporate firms  Corporate firms 
  Coefficient     p-value  Coefficient     p-value 
Homestead exemption  0.0824*   .009  0.0367*  .033 
Homestead exemption squared  -0.000588*   .007  -0.000271*  .030 
Unlimited homestead exemption  4.91*   .025  1.70  .168 
Personal property exemption  -0.139   .233  0.0652  .283 
Personal prop. exemption squared  0.0011   .565  -.000939  .362 
Past bankruptcy   5.71*   .052  2.20*  .053 
Past personal delinquency    2.03   .077  1.45*  .021 
Past business delinquency    -0.867   .392  -0.540  .250 
Owner’s age  0.106*   .002  0.0887*  .000 
Firm’s age  -0.0257   .467  0.0191  .317 
Family owned  2.28   .058  -0.905*  .030 
Female owned  0.501   .541  0.513  .189 
African-American owned  5.26*   .027  8.31*  .000 
Other minority owned  9.10*   .000  1.88*  .007 
Employment (in log form)  -1.35*   .001  -1.33*  .000 
Profit/asset ratio  0.111   .171  0.139*  .017 
Debt/asset ratio  -0.507   .177  -0.206  .205 
Sales growth  -0.00104   .102  0.00952  .442 
HHI  > 1800   -1.18   .088  -0.854*  .015 
Years of bank relationship  0.000923   .986  -0.00365  .989 
Years of bank relationship missing  -.480  .769  3.95*  .007 
Checking account at bank lender  1.31   .328  0.844  .196 
Number of lenders  -2.43   .058  -0.939*  .000 
Intercept   15.2*   .000  13.1*  .000 
        
Number of observations  1801  2779 
Pseudo 
2 R   .0508 .0205 
Log likelihood  -2140.96  -5808.21 
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Table 6:  Effects of Bankruptcy Exemptions on Loan Size 
 
This table presents results from Tobit regressions explaining loan size (in log form) for non-
corporate and corporate firms.  Loan size for all firms that did not receive credit is censored at 
zero.  P-values are given and asterisks indicate statistical significance at the 95 percent level. 
           
  Non-corporate firms  Corporate firms 
  Coefficient     p-value  Coefficient     p-value 
Homestead exemption  -0.0970*     .010     -0.0382  .077 
Homestead exemption squared  0.000677*  .010    0.000304  .051 
Unlimited homestead exemption    -5.18*   .050     -2.34   .129 
Personal property exemption    0.126    .371     -0.0802    .290 
Personal prop. exemption squared  -0.00082    .723    0.00114     .376 
Past bankruptcy    -7.56*     .034     -2.99*     .036 
Past personal delinquency     -3.07*  .027     -1.93*      .014 
Past business delinquency      1.08   .371      0.730   .213 
Owner’s age   -0.127*   .002     -0.120*   .000 
Firm’s age    0.0333    .434     -0.0153    .519 
Family owned   -2.74  .057      1.27*     .015 
Female owned   -1.13     .247     -0.782     .110 
African-American owned   -5.26      .061     -10.04*      .000 
Other minority owned   -10.7*   .000     -2.35*   .007 
Employment (in log form)    1.68 *    .000      1.95*    .000 
Profit/asset ratio   -0.164     .109     -0.173*    .017 
Debt/asset ratio    1.02*      .016      0.284     .158 
Sales growth  0.000927      .209    -0.00851     .576 
HHI  > 1800     1.74*      .036      1.047*  .017 
Years of bank relationship   -0.0209      .737    -0.00436  .898 
Years of bank relationship 
missing 
 -9.99  .000    -5.89  .002 
Checking account at bank lender   -1.363      .400     -1.34  .100 
Number of lenders    2.83      .068      1.17*    .000 
Intercept     2.28      .495      4.98*     .002 
    
Number of observations  1801  2780 
Pseudo 
2 R   .0485 .0220 
Log likelihood  -2275.52  -6133.26 
 
 
 
 
 